We separate many of the basic fragments of classical logic which are used in constructive reverse mathematics. A group of related Kripke and topological models is used to show that various fragments of the Weak Law of the Excluded Middle, the Limited Principle of Omniscience, and Markov's Principle, including Weak Markov's Principle, do not imply each other.
Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century Brouwer identified a number of constructively dubious principles, which Bishop later, in his 1967 monograph [2] , termed omniscience principles. In the intervening years many new (weaker) principles have been introduced and models have been given showing the nonderivability of these principles in, for example, intuitionistic ZF set theory (IZF) [4] .
Omniscience principles are commonly used to show the independence of more subject specific theorems: if a (classical) result constructively implies an omniscience principle, then it cannot be proved using constructive techniques. By separating different omniscience principles over IZF we make this task easier: if under the assumption of a classical result together with an omniscience principle we can derive a stronger omniscience principle, then we can still conclude that the classical theorem is nonconstructive. A more general reason to do this work is that the purpose of the study of logic is to clarify foundational principles; certainly knowing when various combinations of such do and do not imply others is a part of this.
In this paper we present many models, often related to each other, that separate a large number of the omniscience principles defined in terms of binary sequences and related principles. The genesis of this work was the first author's question to the second of whether Richman's LLPO n hierarchy [15] could be separated, a question about results. Since then, much interest has shifted to technique: could an argument for a simple case be extended to a more complicated case? How could a model giving a weak separation (that is, one in which a certain principle is not true but also not false) be re-configured into one giving a strong separation (in which the principle in question is false)? What has to be done to make DC (Dependent Choice) true? We hope that some of the results are of wider interest, such as separations involving a central, traditional axiom like Weak König's Lemma, or a new axiom like Weak Markov's Principle. At the same time, the exposition has a strong orientation to technique, often providing several proofs of the same theorem, in the spirit of a saying we've heard and like, that it's better to prove the same thing five different ways than to prove five different things the same way.
Turning now to the principles we will be studying, constructive mathematics is often crudely characterized as mathematics without the law of excluded middle LEM: for any proposition A, either A is true or A is false, and IZF is essentially the result of expunging LEM from ZF. Our goal is always to end up with models satisfying IZF + Dependent Choice, DC: If a is a set, x 0 ∈ a, S is a subset of a × a, and for each x ∈ a there exists y ∈ a such that (x, y) ∈ S, then there exists a sequence (x n ) n∈N in X such that x 0 = a and (x n , x n+1 ) ∈ S for each n, which is more than sufficient to formalise Bishop's constructive mathematics [2] . Since there is a double-negative translation of ZF into IZF, we lose nothing by adopting ZFC as our meta-theory, and since many of the models we present make use of ultrafilters this classical meta-theory is essential.
Many of the commonly occurring omniscience principles can be stated in terms of binary sequences. We denote the space of infinite binary sequences, Cantor space, by 2 ω and use decorations of α, β to represent elements of 2 ω . We reserve n, m to represent natural numbers, and use i, j, k to range over bounded sets of natural numbers.
Brouwer introduced the following three basic omniscience principles.
The limited principle of omniscience (LPO): For any binary sequence α, either α(n) = 0 for all n or there exists n such that α(n) = 1.
The weak limited principle of omniscience (WLPO): For any binary sequence α, either α(n) = 0 for all n or it is not the case that α(n) = 0 for all n.
The lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO): For any binary sequence α with at most one non-zero term, either α(n) = 0 for all even n or α(n) = 0 for all odd n.
If we add countable choice to our system, then LLPO is equivalent to weak König's lemma: 1 WKL: Every infinite decidable tree has an infinite branch.
In [15] Richman defined a hierarchy of principles LLPO ν (ν ∈ ω + 1, ν 2) related to LLPO:
LLPO ν : Let (P i ) i<ν be a decidable partition of ω into blocks of size ω, and let α be a binary sequence with at most one non-zero term. Then there exists k < ν such that α(m) = 0 for all m ∈ P k .
By glueing together partitions we see that LLPO ν implies LLPO ν whenever ν < ν . If ν = n ∈ ω, then we restrict our consideration to the natural npartition of ω: P i = {mn + i : m ∈ ω}.
LLPO is just the restriction of De Morgan's law-for any propositions A, B, if ¬(A ∧ B), then ¬A or ¬B-to Σ 0 1 -formulas. De Morgan's law is equivalent to LEM for negative formulas: the weak law of excluded middle WLEM: for any proposition A, either ¬A or ¬¬A.
The LLPO n hierarchy can be formed in a similar manner as the restrictions of a family of weakenings of WLEM:
LLPO n is the restriction of WLEM n to Σ 0 1 -formulas. We can define a similar principle WLEM ω by quantifying over the natural numbers.
Another principle commonly considered in constructive reverse mathematics is Markov's principle:
MP: If it is impossible for all terms of α to be zero, then there exists an n such that α(n) = 1.
Markov's principle represents unbounded search and is accepted by some practitioners of constructive mathematics, notably those of the Russian school of recursive mathematics. There are two standard weakenings of Markov's principle, Weak and Disjunctive MP.
WMP:
∀α [∀β (¬¬∃n (β(n) = 1) ∨ ¬¬∃n (α(n) = 1 ∧ β(n) = 0)) → ∃n α(n) = 1].
MP
∨ : If α has at most one non-zero term and it is impossible for all terms of α to be zero, then either all even terms are zero or all odd terms are zero.
Often MP and its variants are stated in terms of real numbers, instead of binary sequences. For instance, WMP in this form is
The binary and real formulations are equivalent with a small amount of choice (weak countable choice suffices). The topological model over R, with the standard topology, shows that some choice is necessary, since MP for binary sequences holds there but MP for reals does not.
Markov's principle is equivalent to the conjunction of WMP and MP ∨ [13, 6] . Finally, we shall also consider the generalisations MP 
Summary
The following diagram summarizes the known (to us) relationships, over IZF, among the principles we have introduced. The double-arrows are bi-implications, and the single arrows are strict, as either proven in this paper or already known.
We summarize briefly, often with well-known constructions, or give references to the reasons for the non-reversal of the black arrows, working from left-to-right in the diagram. Please note that we are not claiming that the proofs or arguments given are the best, or the simplest, or the first, or the canonical ones in some way. We merely want to demonstrate all these non-implications, preferably in a not too difficult way. An example of a model of WLEM + ¬LEM is any (nontrivial) Kripke model over a linear order with no last element. The topological model over R satisfies LPO + ¬LEM. In fact, any (non-trivial) Kripke model over a linear order with no last element and which contains the standard natural numbers (such as the full model over the partial order) satisfies both WLEM and LPO and falsifies LEM. LLPO and WKL are separated in Lifschitz realizability [3] . Kleene's number realizability K 1 separates MP and LLPO ω [15] , giving a whole column of non-reversals; we give a very different model of the same separation below (Theorem 12).
The parallel black and red arrows are because the independence in question has already been shown, but over theories of a different nature from IZF. Kohlenbach [1, 8, 9, 10] achieves all of the non-reversals so indicated, and a lot more, using various realizabilities. The difference in all of these cases from our context is
Fragments of LEM with all implications, over IZF, indicated. Red arrows correspond to separations given in this paper, black and blue arrows to those previously known.
that the models are all of higher-type arithmetic, the higher types being function spaces. A clear difference from IZF is that there are no power sets and no transfinite iterations. A more subtle distinction is the role of Comprehension. In the setting of functionals, a subset is given by a 0-1-valued function. So Comprehension for a property gives Excluded Middle for that property. Hence the amount of Comprehension present in these models is of necessity limited (in the cases at hand, typically to negated formulas or ∃-free formulas). In contrast, IZF has full Comprehension, although its consequences are less weighty. Besides all that, the methods in this paper are so completely different from the earlier realizabilities that we'd want them to get an airing anyway.
For the blue arrows, the equivalence of LPO with WLPO + MP is trivial. It is easy to see that LLPO with Countable Choice is enough to yield WKL; Ishihara [7] has identified exactly the amount of choice needed and shown that to follow from WKL, effectively decomposing WKL into a choice and an omniscience principle. The equivalence of MP with WMP + MP ∨ is in [13] , notwithstanding the facts that all of those principles have different names there, and all are presented in their real number (as opposed to their binary) versions. With sufficient Choice, those versions are of course equivalent, but we would like to see the equivalence of those principles, as stated here (i.e. in terms of binary sequences), without using any Choice. This was done in [6] , and with the same names as here to boot, albeit with MP ∨ phrased differently. Because of that difference, and because the proof there is rather terse, we give the details here. So suppose that not all terms of α are 0. By WMP, we will be done if we can show α is pseudo-positive (i.e. WMP's hypothesis). So let β be arbitrary. Define γ as follows. While generating the values of α and β, let γ continue taking the value 0, until the least n is reached (if ever) with either β(n) or α(n) being 1. If β(n) = 1 then γ(2n) = 1, else γ(2n + 1) = 1, after which γ always has value 0. We would like to apply MP ∨ to γ. By construction, γ has at most one non-zero term. If γ were always 0, then so would be α (because if α(n) = 1 then γ takes on the value 1 at or before 2n + 1). That contradicts the assumption on α, so γ is not always 0. By MP ∨ , either γ's even or odd terms are 0. Suppose the former. Working toward a contradiction, suppose there is no n with α(n) = 1 and β(n) = 0. If there were an n with β(n) = 1 then for some k ≤ n we have γ(2k) = 1, which can't happen. So β is always 0. Hence there is no n with α(n) = 1. But this contradicts the choice of α. So the hypothesis of WMP is satisfied in this case. Now suppose all of γ's odd terms are 0. Working toward a contradiction, assume β is always 0. But then all of γ's even terms would be 0 too, which we already saw cannot happen. So the hypothesis of WMP is satisfied in this case. This suffices.
For the non-reversal of the red arrows over IZF + DC, we refer the reader to 
Topological Models
Many of the models we present are topological models. Although long known [5] , they are not so widely understood, and so we summarize here the basics, as well as some particular results we will need.
Topological models are Heyting valued models where the complete Heyting algebra is the lattice of opens T X of a topological space X. Meet and join in T X are given by intersection and union respectively, while the psuedo-complement → is defined by
where −V denotes the complement of V in X and S • denotes the interior of S. The full topological model over X consists of the class of names or terms,
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The non-derivabilities that give all the non-reversals among the fragments of LEM we study here.
defined inductively by
Given σ ∈ V α (X), the meaning of τ, O ∈ σ is that O is the degree of truth, or truth-value, of τ being in σ. The idea of the full model is to throw in absolutely everything you can. We will have occasion to look at sub-models of the full model. An embedding· of the ground model V into V (X) is defined inductively byǎ = {<b, X >: b ∈ a}.
The truth value of any proposition A, with parameters from V (X), is an open subset of X and is denoted by A . To say that a proposition A is true, or satisfied, in a topological model M X over X means A = X, otherwise A is said to fail in M X . Being false in M X is a stronger property: A is said to be false in M X if M X satisfies ¬A, or equivalently A = ∅. We freely switch between truth value notation · for topological models and forcing notation: a point x ∈ X forces a formula A, written x A, if and only if x ∈ A , and, for an open subset U of X, U A if and only if U ⊂ A .
A particularly important object, the generic, in a topological model M X is described by the name
The generic gives a new element of the topological space over which we are forcing, and is characterised by the equation
See [5] for an introduction to topological models of a constructive formulation of second order arithmetic. Topological models preserve IZF; that is, IZF proves that the full topological model satisfies the axioms of IZF.
We will have need of two simple and well-known observations, summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 Let X be a topological space, x a point of X, and U an open subset of X.
2. U ¬¬A if and only if {x ∈ X : x A} is dense in U .
Proof. The second part of the lemma is just an unpacking of definitions. To see (1) , note that x ¬A if and only if there is a neighbourhood U of x such that no point of U forces A which occurs precisely when x A.
The next result is used to show that most of the topological models we present satisfy DC. A topological space X is dim-zero-dimensional, or of covering dimension zero, if for every open cover (O i ) i∈I of X there exists an open partition (O j ) j∈J of X such that for each j ∈ J, O j ⊂ O i for some i ∈ I. We call (O j ) j∈J a partition refinement of (O i ) i∈I . We can always replace the partition refinement (O j ) j∈J of (O i ) i∈I by a partition refinement indexed by |T X | simply by bulking out (O j ) j∈J with copies of the empty set.
Proof. Denote by λ the cardinality of T X and suppose, without loss of generality, that X ∀s ∈ S ∃t ∈ S (ϕ(s, t)) ∧ s 0 ∈ S.
Then for each s, { ϕ(s, t) : t ∈ S} is an open cover of X. We inductively construct O σ , t σ (σ ∈ λ <ω ) such that for each σ ∈ λ <ω and each n ∈ ω
We begin by setting O = X and t = s 0 . Now suppose we have constructed O σ and t σ for all σ ∈ ω n and fix a string σ in λ n . Let (O n ) n∈λ be a partition refinement of { ϕ(t σ , t) : t ∈ S}. For each α ∈ λ we set O σ α = O σ ∩ O α and t σ α = t for some t such that O n ⊂ ϕ(t σ , t) . This completes the inductive construction.
By (1), X forces that f is a sequence in S, and by (2) X ∀n ∈ ω ϕ(f (n), f (n + 1)).
LPO and WLEM
Theorem 3 Over IZF, LPO does not imply WLEM ω .
We give several proofs. The first has the benefit of being a well-known model. It has the drawback of falsifying DC.
Proof. First construction: The full topological model M R 2 over R 2 satisfies LPO and falsifies WLEM ω . If x forces that σ is an infinite binary sequence, then some connected neighbourhood O of x forces the same. Then for each n, O is the disjoint union of σ(n) = 0 ∩ O and σ(n) = 1 ∩ O, and so either O ⊂ σ(n) = 0 or O ⊂ σ(n) = 1 . Thus O forces σ to be a ground model sequence and hence, applying LPO at the meta-level, either x ∀n σ(n) = 0 or x ∃n σ(n) = 1.
We show that (0, 0) WLEM ω . Since there is nothing special about (0, 0), it follows that M R 2 ¬ WLEM ω . For each n ∈ ω set
that is, take a countable sequence of disjoint wedges in the upper half-plane with vertex the origin. Let A n be the statement0 ∈ {<0, S n >}; viewing S n as a truth value, A n means "S n is true." Since the S n are mutually disjoint
However, since (0, 0) is in the closure of each S n , (0, 0) cannot force any A n to be false, and hence does not force WLEM ω .
The most basic models separating two principles are models in which the weaker principle is true while the stronger principle is not satisfied, as opposed to being false-we call these weak separations. The second model is such a weak separation.
Proof. Second construction: Let N + be N ∪ { * }, with the discrete topology on N and the only neighborhood of {*} being the whole space. Then the full topological model of N + is the same thing as the full Kripke model with bottom node * and its immediate successors n (n ∈ N). If * |= α is a binary sequence, then using LPO in the meta-theory either * |= α(n) = 1 for some particular n, or * |= α(n) = 0 for all n, which fact persists to all the successor nodes. LPO holds at the other nodes because they are terminal nodes and so classical logic holds there. DC holds at all nodes using DC in the meta-theory. WLEM ω fails: letting 0 n ⊆ 1 be such that k |= 0 ∈ 0 n iff k = n, the statements "0 ∈ 0 n " are pairwise incompatible yet none are false at *.
Of course, WLEM ω does not fail in the model above, because full classical logic holds at the terminal nodes. In order to get a strong separation, one in which WLEM ω is false, we must iterate the previous construction.
Proof. Third construction: Consider the partial order N <N , ordered by endextension. Take the full Kripke model over that p.o. Then DC and LPO hold at each node as above, and WLEM ω fails at each node as above.
Markov's Principle
The next batch of models has to do with falsifying MP and its fragments, sometimes while retaining other parts of it.
Since MP has been so prominent for so long, it's no surprise that there have already been models developed that make it false. Such models have been of all sorts: topological [14, 11] , Beth [21] , realizability [17, 22] , a mix [23] . Much of the earlier interest came from the incompatibility of MP with Kripke's Schema. That is, MP + KS proves full Excluded Middle ( [19] , p. 237), which was enough to stop Brouwer right there, and with any amount of continuity proves an outright contradiction. So some of the earlier falsifications of MP were almost accidental by-products of modeling KS plus continuity. Perhaps surprisingly, the most prominent model of Brouwer's intuitionism, Kleene's functional realizability K 2 , actually satisfies MP (see [18] , p. 428).
Each model falsifying MP of necessity provides one of the separations in Figure  2 . The thing is, we don't know which. These fragments of MP have been less studied, and so the original authors did not concern themselves with which of them held in their models. It would be interesting to see what holds where. In what follows, we present instead what believe are new models, in part to have some more models in the literature, in part because this is how we view these separations, and in part because it's easier this way.
Weak Markov's Principle
Theorem 4 Over IZF, WLEM does not imply WMP.
Proof. First construction: Let f : V → M be an elementary embedding of the universe of sets V into a model M with non-standard integers. For instance, M could be an ultrapower of V using a non-principal ultrafilter U on ω. Let K be the two-node Kripke model with M at the top node and the sets at the bottom node ⊥ defined inductively, as follows. Given
It is easy to see that IZF holds. WLEM is true because the partial order is linear. WMP fails by considering a binary sequence α which always takes on the value 0 at all standard places and has a 1 in a non-standard place. The hypothesis of WMP holds: given any β, either |= ∃n β(n) = 1, thereby satisfying the first disjunct, or it doesn't, forcing β to be the 0 sequence and thereby satisfying the second disjunct. But the conclusion of WMP fails at ⊥.
This, of course, provides only a weak separation. To get a strong separation, we must iterate the construction.
Proof. Second construction: Take for the underlying partial order the natural numbers ω. The intuition is to iterate the ultrapower. Each node n has a base model M n , which for 0 is V , for 1 is M from above, and for n + 1 is the ultrapower of M n via f (U), where f is the (polymorphic) elementary embedding and U is a non-principal ultrafilter on ω (in V).
We would like to take something like the full model over ω. The limitation is that the base models keep changing, and we must preserve ∈-induction. So toward this end, assume inductively that for all β < α (where α and β are in V ) we have at node 0 the sets or terms K 0 β of rank β. By elementarity, the same holds at node n for all β < f (α). Further assume we have the transition
, and hence at n for β < f (α) transition functions f n from K n β to K n+1 f (β) . Then at n the sets of rank f (α), K n f (α) , will be functions g such that:
Let f n (g) be g ω\(n + 1).
WLEM and WMP stand and fall for the same reasons as above. IZF holds by standard arguments, which are to some degree repeated in the next argument.
Later on we will be in several situations where the full model just does not work. A certain restriction of it will, and as it turns out the same kind of restriction also works in the current setting. Since the current setting is simpler than what we will later be up against, we present that argument here.
Proof. Third construction: We start with the same partial order and base models as before. The difference is that a set at n can change (i.e. grow) going to n + 1, but then must stop changing for later nodes, subject only to remaining in the corresponding base model. So assume inductively that for all β < α in V we have at node 0 the sets or terms K 0 β of rank β. By elementarity, the same holds at node n for all β < f (α). Further assume we have the transition function f 0 from K
, where f here is the elementary embedding from M n+1 to M n+2 , and
In addition, we must extend f n to these new sets:
WLEM and WMP stand and fall as above. IZF holds mostly because of the elementarity, as follows. We leave the verification of Empty Set, Infinity, Pair, Union, and Extensionality to the reader. We show ∈-Induction, Power Set, Collection, and Separation.
Suppose n |= ∀x(∀y ∈ x φ(y) → φ(x)). If n |= ∀x φ(x), let m ≥ n be the least integer such that, for some g ∈ K m , m |= φ(g). In case m = n, we need to concern ourselves with φ's parameters, which could change arbitrarily (as opposed to canonically, via f ) when going to the successor node. So consider the case that for some k > m there is a g ∈ K k with k |= φ(g). In M k pick such a g of least ordinal rank, say α. Each member of g at node k satisfies φ at k, by the choice of g. Furthermore, for all j > k, by elementarity, in M j the least rank of a set not satisfying φ is f (α), and all the members of f k (g) at node j have smaller rank. So k |= ∀y ∈ g φ(y), hence k |= φ(g), which is a contradiction. Hence m + 1 |= ∀x φ(x). Now go back to node m. Pick a g there of minimal rank not satisfying φ. By the minimality of g, if m |= h ∈ g, then m |= φ(h). By the previous result, in particular if k |= h ∈ g then k |= φ(h). So m |= ∀x ∈ g φ(x). Hence by the hypothesis on n we have m |= φ(g), which suffices.
The argument for Power Set is likely the most interesting one, since it's the limited nature of set existence that makes this model most distinctive. So it may well be helpful to give a hands-on description of the Power Set of the most central example, 1, a.k.a. {0}. At any node, 1 viewed externally has three subsets: 0 = ∅, 1 itself, and the set that now looks like 0 but at the next node will be 1, which we will call 1 . So P(1) is given by P(1)(⊥) = {0, 1, 1 }, and P(1)( ) = f (P(1)(⊥)). So while the "three" members at ⊥ collapse to two at , a new third member re-appears. More generally, given
The remaining axioms are completely straightforward. Regarding Collection, even more is true. Reflection in the ground model yields Reflection in the Kripke model: for V α ≺ Σn V , cutting off the construction of the model at α, which is K 0 α , yields a Σ n substructure of the entire model. As far as Separation goes, at node n, {x ∈ g | φ(x)} is given by h(⊥) = {x ∈ g(⊥) | n |= φ(x)} and
A limitation of all the constructions above is that we don't even know whether any satisfies DC, which is quite annoying. This is remedied in the following.
Proof. Fourth construction: The key idea of many of the following separation theorems is contained in this construction, which is a full topological model.
The points of the topological space are the natural numbers with an extra point at infinity: X = ω ∪ { * }. To define the topology on X take a non-principal ultrafilter U on ω. Define a topology T X on X by taking
and closing under union; for singleton opens, we write k in place of {k}.
The intuition is as follows. Interpret the elements of X as binary sequences with at most one nonzero term: k ∈ ω corresponds to the sequence α k with a unique 1 in the k th position, and * corresponds to the constant zero sequence α * . So the generic is a binary sequence α G , with at most one non-zero term. Then k α G =α k and u ∪ { * } α G (n) = 0 for each n / ∈ u, since no extension of u ∪ { * } forces α G (n) = 1. Note that for each n ∈ ω since U is a non-principal ultrafilter there is a u in U such that n / ∈ u and so u ∪ { * } α G (n) = 0. Hence, in M X , α G is indeed a binary sequence with at most one non-zero term.
We claim that the full topological model M X over (X, T X ) satisfies WLEM and DC, and does not satisfy WMP.
For WLEM, let A be an arbitrary formula. Since isolated points behave classically, we need only give a neighbourhood of * which forces ¬A ∨ ¬¬A. Let X 0 = {k ∈ ω : k ¬A} and
Since the isolated nodes behave classically, ω = X 0 ∪ X 1 and so either X 0 ∈ U or X 1 ∈ U. We show that in the former case, X 0 ∪ { * } ¬A and in the latter X 1 ∪{ * } ¬¬A. In the first case, every extension O of X 0 ∪{ * } can be extended to k for some k ∈ X 0 . Since such a k forces ¬A, no extension of X 0 ∪ { * } can force A; thus X 0 ∪ { * } ¬A. The second case is similar: any extension of X 1 ∪ { * } can be further extended to some k forcing A, so no such extension can force ¬A.
As for dependent choice, since {k} is open for each k ∈ ω, X is dim-zero dimensional and hence, by Lemma 2, M X satisfies DC.
While the failure of weak Markov's principle is stronger than that of simple Markov's principle, the latter is easier to understand and more common, so it might be instructive to see first why MP fails for the generic α G . Given an open set in X we can always extend to a singleton and so, since k α G (ǩ) = 1 for each singleton open k, no open forces that α G (n) = 0 for all n; that is M X ¬∀n ∈ ω α G (n) = 0. Consider an open neighbourhood O of * and fix n ∈ ω. Then for any k ∈ O \ {n, * }, k extends O and k forces α G (n) = 0. Hence * does not force 'there exists n such that α G (n) = 1', so
Regarding WMP, since we have already seen that α G is not forced to be 1 somewhere, it suffices to show that α G is forced to be pseudo-positive. So let β be arbitrary. On the open set {k} this is clear: α(k) = 1, and β(k) is either 0 or 1. We need only find an appropriate neighborhood of { * }. Let X 0 be {k | k ∃n β(n) = 1}, and
Of course, WMP does not fail in the model above, because, as above, full classical logic holds at the isolated points. In order to get a strong separation in which WMP is false, we must iterate.
Proof. Fifth construction: Let
Take the full topological model over T .
DC holds by Lemma 2, which applies because each basic open is clopen.
For WLEM, we have to show that each node σ is in some open set O either forcing ¬A or forcing ¬¬A. We say that σ is determined if some neighborhood of σ decides ¬A (i.e. forces ¬A or ¬¬A); we can assume that such a neighborhood is a basic open set with σ as its root. Notice that if {n | σ n is determined} ∈ U then σ is determined: letting O n (with root σ n) decide ¬A for each such n, one of {σ} ∪ {O n | O n ¬A} and {σ} ∪ {O n | O n ¬¬A} is open.
We need to show that every node is determined. Suppose σ is not. We build a set of nodes O inductively, all of which are undetermined. We start with σ ∈ O. Notice that if τ is undetermined then UND τ = {n | τ n is undetermined} is in U. Regarding WMP, we show that no basic open set O with arbitrary root σ forces WMP, which suffices. Let α be a term such that, for k with σ k ∈ O, we have
It remains only to show that O forces the hypothesis of WMP.
Toward that end, let β be an arbitrary term for a binary sequence. Since O k α(n) = 1 ↔ n = k, beneath O k the WMP hypothesis reduces to ¬¬∃n β(n) = 1 ∨ β(k) = 0. By WLEM, we have ¬∃n β(n) = 1 ∨ ¬¬∃n β(n) = 1, which implies what we want for any O k . It remains only to find a neighborhood of σ forcing what we want.
Let X 0 be {n | some neighborhood of σ n forces ¬¬∃n β(n) = 1} and X 1 be {n | some neighborhood of σ n forces ¬∃n β(n) = 1}. If X 0 ∈ U then some neighborhood of σ forces the first disjunct in WMP; if X 1 ∈ U then some neighborhood of σ forces the second.
There is a different way of looking at the previous construction, which we sketch briefly (as opposed to calling it a sixth construction ;-) ).
Rather than having the entire tree ω <ω be present all at once, it can be rolled out level-by-level within a Kripke model. Toward this end, let K be the full Kripke model over the partial order ω. Let the topological space T consist at node n of ω ≤n . So, for instance, at node 0, T contains as a subset ω 0 = ω ∅ = {∅}, so T looks like a single-point space, {*}. A basic open set O at node n contains a unique shortest sequence σ, and if, at n, σ ∈ O has length less than n, then {i | n |= σ i ∈ O} ∈ U. Finally, we need to explain what f n (O) looks like, where f n is the transition function from node n. Notice that we have chosen a restricted notion of open set. For instance, at node 0 the only open set is the entire space. Other subsets of T exist in K, which could legitimately have been taken to be open. For instance, the set which at 0 contains ∅ and at 1 contains U-many but not all extensions. This restricted notion demands a corresponding restriction in the sets allowed in the model. At node n, no name for a set in the topological model may grow at future nodes. That is, suppose t is a name for a set in the model at node n, so that t consists of pairs of the form s, O , where s is also such a name and O an open set at n. Then at any future node f n (t) consists entirely of pairs f n (s), f n (O) . In particular, no new open sets may be appear within f n (t).
The proof that a full topological model satisfies IZF is valid constructively, and so holds within K. That our restricted topological model satisfies IZF would have to be checked in detail. DC holds by re-doing the proof of Proposition 2, using DC in K and the countability of each level of T . WMP fails for the same reason as in the previous construction. The validation of WLEM uses the fact that the truth value of a statement at node n is an open set, of the kind described, at node n.
For a seventh construction, start as above, while allowing all possible open sets, and take the full model.
Separating the Hierarchies
In this section we separate the WLEM n , LLPO n , and MP Note that Theorem 5 separates all three of the hierarchies at once, for if WLEM n+1 does not imply MP ∨ n , then it does not imply the stronger principles WLEM n or LLPO n , and hence these latter principles cannot be proved from LLPO n+1 or MP ∨ n+1 which are weaker than WLEM n+1 .
Proof. First construction: Corresponding to the previous theorem's first construction, consider the Kripke partial order with root ⊥ and n-many immediate successors 0, ... , n − 1. At the successor nodes put M an ultrapower of V with non-standard integers. At ⊥ put all sets that can grow arbitrarily at any successor node. WLEM n+1 holds because, given n + 1-many mutually incompatible assertions, at each successor node at most one is true, so there's at least one false in all of them, and that one is false at ⊥. MP ∨ n fails, by taking the sequence which is all 0's at ⊥, and at node i has a 1 in a (necessarily non-standard) slot in the i th slice of ω.
That gives only a weak separation. We'd of course like a strong separation. The reader should note that the construction corresponding to the last theorem's second does not work! That construction would be the n-branching tree, with base model M k at all nodes of length k. The problem is that WLEM n+1 would fail. Consider for simplicity the case n = 2. So the nodes of length 1 are labeled 0 and 1. Suppose we have pairwise incompatible statements A 0 , A 1 , A 2 . To be sure, at node 0 at most one is true, and at node 1 at most another, leaving a third true at neither. But consider the nodes 00, 01, 10, and 11. There's plenty of room there for each A i to be true somewhere.
Proof. Second construction: As in the third construction above, let the Kripke partial order be the n-branching tree. The base model for a node of length k is M k . Allow only those sets that can change from one node to an immediate successor, and afterwards the transition function is essentially given by the elementary embedding.
IZF holds and MP
∨ n fail as above. To see why WLEM n+1 holds, consider a statement A at node σ. Because of A's parameters, the truth of A at some successor σ i might be different from at σ j. But by elementarity, the truth at σ i is the same as at all of its successors.
We do not know whether DC holds in that model, so we give a topological model, corresponding to the fourth construction just above.
Proof. Third construction: Since the notation gets sufficiently ghastly to obscure the simple idea behind these models, we give first the case n = 2 before sketching the general construction.
Let X = ω ∪ { * } as before and let U be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω. Let f 0 , f 1 be the functions on ω sending n to 2n and 2n + 1 respectively, and set U i = {f i "u : u ∈ U} and ω i = f i "ω (i = 0, 1). We give X the topology generated by taking the emptyset ∅, {k} for each k ∈ ω, and u 0 ∪ u 1 ∪ { * } where u i ∈ U i (i = 0, 1), and closing under unions. Let M X be the full model over X. As in the previous section, we can associate to the generic a binary sequence α G forced by X to have at most one non-zero term and such that ¬∀n ∈ ω α G (n) = 0. Recall, in particular, that k α G =α k for each k ∈ ω. Since any open O containing * can be extended to a singleton k 0 ∈ ω 0 and a singleton k 1 ∈ ω 1 , * does not force ∀n ∈ ω α G (2n) = 0 ∨ ∀n ∈ ω α G (2n + 1) = 0. Hence M X MP ∨ .
Suppose, without loss of generality, that X forces ¬ 3 i,j=0,i =j A i ∧ A j for some formulas A 0 , . . . , A n with parameters from V (X). For i = 0, 1 we define For arbitrary n, let X, U be as before. For i = 0, . . . , n − 1 define a function f i on ω by f i : m → nm + i; let U i be the image of U under f i and ω i be the image of ω under f i . A base for the topology on X is given by taking the emptyset ∅, {k} for each k ∈ ω, and u 0 ∪ · · · ∪ u n−1 ∪ { * } where u i ∈ U i (0 i n − 1).
The generic demonstrates that * does not satisfy MP ∨ n .
For any formulas A 0 , . . . , A n , with parameters from V (X), such that X forces ¬ n i,j=0,i =j A i ∧ A j , we form the sets
Since U is an ultrafilter, for each i there exists j i such that X i ji ∈ U i . Then
is an open set and by the pigeon-hole principle there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that O forces ¬A j .
DC holds, by Lemma 2.
The isolated points are dense in X, so Excluded Middle holds densely, hence this is a weak separation. We would like a strong separation. The most straightforward way you'd think to do this is a start, but does not work entirely. That would be to adapt the last theorem's fifth construction, namely (in the case n=2, say) to let the points be ω <ω , and to say that a set O is open if, whenever σ ∈ O, both the even and the odd children of σ in O are in U. That doesn't do what we want, because by considering the grandchildren of σ there's enough room for four statements to be true.
The additional component needed is to take the sub-model consisting of those sets that can change from a node to any of the node's children, and then have to stop changing. In order for the model not to be trivial at those children, new sets have to be introduced, which then themselves have one generation during which they are allowed to change. What this involves is partial existence: there are some sets at nodes that are not the images of any sets from earlier nodes. This phenomenon is not new. It is perhaps best known via Kripke models with non-constant domains, and has also been studied in more general contexts, first in [16] and later exposited in [5] and [20] (sec. 13.6), where the logic of partial existence was worked out. The model here has aspects of a Kripke model, in that it is based on a partial order, ω <ω , and depends on partial existence. But it's not a Kripke model, instead making essential use of the topology, because a statement being true at a node does not mean that it's true at all children, rather merely on an open set of children. This situation imposes an additional burden: for a full topological or full Kripke model, there's already a metatheorem saying that it models IZF; since the following model does not fit into such a framework, IZF has to be checked by hand.
Proof. Fourth construction: The guiding intuition is the space from the fifth construction of the last theorem. That would be to work over ω <ω , and to require of an open set O (in the case of n = 2, for notational simplicity) that for σ ∈ O both {n | σ 2n ∈ O} and {n | σ 2n + 1 ∈ O} be in U. The fact is, though, that the model is homogeneous: every node looks like every other node. So it suffices to work with only the bottom level, {⊥} ∪ ω.
The objects at all nodes are defined inductively, as well as the transition functions f i from ⊥ to i. The sets built by stage α will be the same at all nodes, and so the notation T α suffices. The construction will be a lot like the previous theorem's third construction. A big difference is that here the base models are always V . This obviates of course all concerns about where these objects exist. Another difference is that there it was easier to formalize the notion of a set not changing anymore, because there was only one successor node, whereas here we have infinitely many successors. Hence there is a need for the notion of canonical sets CT α , which we also define inductively, as those functions g such that
, and
As for T α ,
In addition, we must extend f i to these new sets: f i (g)(⊥) = g(i) = f i (g)(j). It is easy to check that CT α ⊆ T α , that f i (g) ∈ CT α and, for g ∈ CT α , f i (g) = g. Now we need to define truth in this model. Inductively on formulas φ, we define a set φ ⊆ {⊥} ∪ ω. By way of notation, f i (φ) refers to the result of applying f i to each of φ's parameters, and f ⊥ (g) = g. Also, if A ⊆ ω, then A i is the i th slice of A:
•
, and vice versa} ∪ {⊥ | ∀f ∈ g(⊥) ⊥ ∈ f ∈ h and vice versa, and ∀i < n g = h i ∈ U}
Proof. Both parts are proved together via a simultaneous induction.
Regarding a), for i = ⊥ this is trivial.
But f ⊥ is the identity function, so those are the same.
we have ⊥ ∈ f ∈ f i (h) and vice versa. Notice this is exactly the first clause of ⊥ ∈ f i (g = h), so the right-to-left direction is proven. The second clause of
If i ∈ g = h , then it is straightforward to check that f i (g) = f i (h) contains all of ω, and so each slice is in the ultrafilter.
The cases φ ∧ ψ and φ ∨ ψ are trivial to check via induction.
For →, we have i ∈ φ → ψ iff i ∈ ψ or i ∈ φ . The first case inductively is equivalent to ⊥ ∈ f i (ψ) , which is one of the two ways that ⊥ gets into f i (φ → ψ) . The other way ⊥ gets in is if ⊥ ∈ f i (φ) and for each j < n we have [
The first of those two clauses is equivalent inductively to the second case. Furthermore, if ⊥ ∈ f i (φ) , then, inductively,
For the quantifiers, consider ∃: i ∈ ∃x φ(x) iff for some h we have i ∈ φ(h) iff, inductively, for some
, where σ is the permutation that interchanges i and j and leaves everything else alone. So for some h, namely h • σ, we have ⊥ ∈ f i (φ)(f i (h)) , which we have already seen is equivalent to i ∈ ∃x φ(x) .
Finally, i ∈ ∀x φ(x) iff for each h we have ⊥ ∈ f i (φ)(h) . Notice that condition is exactly the first clause of ⊥ ∈ f i (∀x φ(x)) . The second clause is ∀j < n ∀x f i (φ)(x) j ∈ U. So suppose that for each h we have ⊥ ∈ f i (φ)(h) . We want to see when k ∈ ∀x f i (φ)(x) , that is, whether for all
, so this is exactly our supposition.
Now to show part b). There are some easy cases: if φ is an equality or a universal statement, this is built right into the definition of φ . If φ is a disjunction or conjunction, this follows easily from U being an ultrafilter. For an implication, if ⊥ ∈ ψ , inductively each ψ i ∈ U, and those slices are subsets of [ ψ ∪ (ω\ φ )] i , which are then also in U. If ⊥ ∈ ψ then there is only one other way ⊥ can get into φ → ψ , and that other way has part b) built in.
For the existential case, suppose for some h we have ⊥ ∈ φ(h) . Inductively, for each i < n, φ(h) i ∈ U. Suppose j ∈ φ(h) i , i.e. jn + i ∈ φ(h) . So for that h it holds that jn + i ∈ φ(h) , which means jn + i ∈ ∃x φ(x) . In short, φ(h) i ⊆ ∃x φ(x) i , and so the latter set is also in U.
Finally, consider membership. If ⊥ ∈ g ∈ h , then there is an f ∈ h(⊥) with
. Separately from that, by the last clause of the definition of a set,
If j is in both sets, then j ∈ g ∈ h i , and of course ultrafilters are closed under intersection.
Corollary 7
If all of φ's parameters are canonical, then φ is either empty or ω ∪ {⊥}.
Lemma 8 The equality axioms (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity) all get full value.
Now we check that that the axioms of IZF + DC get full value. First note that the ground model embeds into this model as the hereditarily constant functions. So Emptyset and Infinity hold, as witnessed by the images of ∅ and ω. Pair holds, for, given f and g, let h be such that h(⊥) = {f, g} and
For Union, given g, let ( g)(⊥) be {f | f ∈ h(⊥) for some h ∈ g(⊥)}, and ( g)(i) be {f | f ∈ h(⊥) for some h ∈ g(i)}. We leave the verification that these four constructions satisfy their axioms to the reader.
About the two structural axioms, ∈-Induction is simple, because the sets were defined inductively on the ordinals.
Regarding Extensionality, we need to show that
We will show for all h ∈ f (i) (⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (g) ) if and only if for all h (⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (f ) → h ∈ f i (g) ), the reasoning for the other directions being analogous.
Considering the left-to-right direction first. Let h be arbitrary. The RHS holds when either ⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (g) , or both ⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (f ) and for each j < n the
If so, then for someĥ ∈ f (i) it holds that ⊥ ∈ h =ĥ . By hypothesis, ⊥ ∈ ĥ ∈ f i (g). That means that for someĝ ∈ g(i) we'd have ⊥ ∈ ĥ =ĝ . By transitivity, ⊥ ∈ h =ĝ, and we'd be done with this direction. The other possibility is ⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (f ) . Let q ∈ ω be arbitrary. If q ∈ h ∈ f i (f ) then for someĥ ∈ f i (f )(q) it holds that ⊥ ∈ f q (h) =ĥ . Then by the lemma ⊥ ∈ f q (h) ∈ f q (f i (f )) = f i (f ) , meaning that for someĥ ∈ f (i) ⊥ ∈ f q (h) =ĥ. By hypothesis, ⊥ ∈ ĥ ∈ f i (g) . Arguing as above with transitivity,
) is all of ω, and again we're done. Now consider the right-to-left direction. Let h be in f (i). By hypothesis, ⊥ ∈ h ∈ f i (f ) → h ∈ f i (g) . Since h ∈ f i (f ) gets full value, so does h ∈ f i (g) .
We still need to handle the case i = ⊥. This is similar, and left to the reader.
The final axioms IZF axioms are Collection, Separation, and Power Set. Actually, not just Collection, but even Reflection is true. Let α be such that V α ≺ Σn V . Let g α be the construction of the model up to stage α: g α (q) = β<α CT β . Then any formula of classical complexity Σ n reflects to g α . For Separation, for {h ∈ a | φ(h)}, let g(q) be {h ∈ a(q) | ⊥ ∈ f q (φ)(h) }. We illustrated Power Set via the most critical case, P(1). Of course, the empty set is represented in the model by the constant function which we either suggestively or ambiguously call 0: 0(q) = ∅. Similarly, 1(q) = {0}. A subset of 1 is given by certain sets A, in that 1 A (q) = {0} if q ∈ A and 1 A (q) = ∅ otherwise. For such a function 1 A to be a set in the model, if ⊥ ∈ A then each A i (i < n) must be in U. Then P(1)(q) = {1 A | 1 A is a set in the model }. More generally, h represents a subset of g if h(q) ⊆ g(q) for all q, and in addition h represents a set in the model by satisfying clauses 3 and 4 in the definition of T α ; P(g)(q) is the set of those h's representing a subset of f q (g).
For DC, it is straightforward to build a choice sequence, using DC in the metatheory.
Finally, WLEM n+1 gets full value, and MP ∨ n the empty set, as follows. Given pairwise incompatible φ i , i ≤ n, the φ i are disjoint. So, for a fixed k < n, there is at most one i ≤ n with φ i k ∈ U. Hence there is a fixed i with each φ i k not in U. For that i, ⊥ ∈ ¬φ i . Of course, for each j ∈ φ i (for that matter, for each j ∈ ω), there is some i with j ∈ ¬φ i . So ∃i ¬φ i = {⊥} ∪ ω. In contrast, let α be such that α(k) = 1 = ω k (for k < n; for k ≥ n let α(k) = 1 = ∅). Then α is a counter-example to MP Proof. Any of the constructions from above generalize quite easily. For instance, take the Kripke model with root ⊥ and countably many successors. At the terminal nodes put an ω-non-standard M . Let α at ⊥ look like all 0's, and at node n have a 1 in some non-standard position in the n th block. This can be iterated as in the second construction above, with sets that settle down one node after they appear. For that matter, since we're no longer trying to preserve any part of WLEM, we can take the full Kripke model over the partial order ω <ω , with base M k for nodes of length k.
Or we could take a topological model. Let {ω i : i ∈ ω} be a partition of ω into blocks of size ω and let f i be a bijection between ω and ω i for each i. Let U be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω and U i the image of U under f i (i ∈ ω). We take X = ω ∪ { * } and form opens by taking unions of: ∅, {k} (k ∈ ω), and sets of the form {u i : u i ∈ U i } ∪ { * }. The generic binary sequence is then a (weak) counterexample to MP ∨ ω . DC holds by Lemma 2. Again, this can be iterated in any of a number of ways as above.
Theorem 10 There is a model of IZF in which WLEM ω holds but each MP ∨ n fails.
Proof. First construction: Start with a Kripke partial order with ⊥ on bottom and successors 0, 1, 2, ... . At node n put an ω-non-standard ultrapower M of V , the same for all n. At ⊥, take all sets that eventually become constant. That is, with f n the transition function from ⊥ to n, take all sets x such that, for some k and all n > k, f n (x) = f k (x). It's easy to check that this satisfies IZF. WLEM ω holds, as follows. Given an ω-sequence of mutually incompatible statements A i at ⊥, let x be the parameter used to define that family. Let k be the point beyond which x becomes constant. At each node 0, 1, ... , k, at most one A i is true, and beyond k the only true A i is the one true at k, if any. So there is at least one (in fact, infinitely many) A i false at all terminal nodes, and hence also false at ⊥. Each MP ∨ n fails, because there's no bound on the k by which an x stops changing. This is, of course, a weak separation. We would like a strong separation. To that effect, iterate the previous construction. The Kripke partial order is ω <ω , a set has to settle down the level after it appears, and considering the transition functions f n when applied to a set, they're eventually constant.
We do not know whether DC holds in those examples. To get a model of DC, we have to adapt the earlier topological example. That goes as follows. Partition ω into infinitely many infinite sets. The topology on ω ∪ {⊥} is that each {k} is open, and A ∪ {⊥} is a neighborhood of {⊥} iff A i ∈ U, where A i = {n | the n th element of the i th slice of ω is in A}. Each k ∈ ω induces a function f k from the sets in the full topological model onto V , by interpreting an open set O as true if k ∈ O and false otherwise. Take the sub-model of the full model consisting of those sets x that eventually settle down on slices: there is a j such that f k (x) is independent of the choice of k, as long as k is in ω's i th slice and i ≥ j. At this point it is routine to check that IZF + DC + WLEM ω hold and ∃n M P ∨ n does not.
To get a strong separation with DC, we have to iterate the topological example. This is as in the last construction of the preceding theorem.
Thus far we have been discussing separating principles underneath MP in Figure  2 . With the development of WMP, though, one must ask whether WMP implies MP.
Theorem 11 Over IZF + DC, WMP does not imply MP.
Proof. Consider the topological model over Q. By Proposition 2, DC holds.
To see that MP fails, let r ∈ Q. Let O n be a nested sequence of open intervals with irrational endpoints and intersection {r}. Let α be such that O n α(n) = 0 and Q\O n α(n) = 1. Then α is a counter-example to MP at any neighborhood containing r.
In contrast, WMP holds. Let O ∀β(¬¬∃n (β(n) = 1) ∨ ¬¬∃n (α(n) = 1∧β(n) = 0)) and r ∈ O. We must find a neighborhood of r forcing ∃n α(n) = 1. For each n, let O n be the maximal interval containing r which decides the value of α(i) for all i < n. If any O n forces any α(i) to be 1, we are done. Suppose not. It cannot be the case that n O n contains an open interval I with r ∈ I, because, in the case, letting β be the constant 0 function, no subinterval of I could force either ¬¬∃n (β(n) = 1) or ¬¬∃n (α(n) = 1), contrary to hypothesis. So n O n has r as either its left endpoint or its right endpoint (or both). Assume without loss of generality it's the first option. Define β as follows. For one, (r, ∞) β(n) = 0 for all n. Hence, (r, ∞) ¬∃n β(n) = 1. Also, O n β(n) = 0. Finally, (−∞, inf O n ) β(n) = 1. That means (−∞, r) ¬∃n (α(n) = 1 ∧ β(n) = 0), because whenever α is forced to be 1 so is β. So no neighborhood of r can force either disjunct to the hypothesis of WMP, contrary to assumption. This contradiction finishes the proof.
It's worth pointing out that the same arguments show the same result for the model over Cantor space 2 ω .
It's also worth observing what happens in the model over R. The binary sequences in that model are (the images of) binary sequences from the ground model, so MP for binary sequences holds. But by similar arguments to those here, MP for reals fails, while WMP for reals holds.
Regarding the non-implication from MP to LLPO ω , it was observed in [15] that a quite standard model (realizability using the Turing computable functions) does it. Still, we think it fitting to provide a model doing the same thing in the style of the other models of this paper.
Theorem 12 [15] Over IZF + DC, MP does not imply LLPO ω .
Proof. Let {ω i : i ∈ ω} be a partition of ω into blocks of size ω and let f i be a bijection between ω and ω i for each i. Let U be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω and U i the image of U under f i (i ∈ ω). We take X = ω ∪ { * , ∞} and form opens by taking unions of: ∅, {k} (k ∈ ω), {∞}, and sets of the form
Take the full model over X. As a full model, IZF holds. By Proposition 2, DC holds. Let α be such that {k} α(n) = 1 iff n = k, and {∞} α(n) = 0 for all n. It is easy to see that α is a counter-example to LLPO ω . As for MP, suppose * ∈ O and O ¬¬∃n β(n) = 1. Then {∞} ⊆ O, and {∞} ∃n β(n) = 1. Let k be such that {∞} β(k) = 1. Let O ⊆ O be a neighborhood of * forcing a value of β(k). Since ∞ ∈ O , O must force β(k) to be 1, which suffices.
To get a strong separation, this can be iterated in any of a number of ways as above.
WLPO and WKL
It has been pointed out to us by Kohlenbach that WLPO and WKL are separated by functional Lifschitz realizability. They can also be separated in the style of this paper by using a Kripke model.
Theorem 13
Over IZF, WKL does not imply WLPO.
Proof. First construction: The Kripke poset P consists of a root node ⊥ with two successors 0 and 1. At 0 the universe V 0 is the ground model V . The universe V 1 at 1 will be an ultrapower M of V 0 using a non-principal ultrafilter on ω, thus adding nonstandard integers. Denote by f the elementary embedding of V into M . For the universe V ⊥ at ⊥, intuitively we take all the possible sets, so the elements of V ⊥ look like elements of V at the root and can grow arbitrarily to a set in V 0 when we pass to 0 and to a set in V 1 when 1. More formally, we define V ⊥ and transition functions f ⊥,i : V ⊥ → V i (i = 0, 1) by simultaneous transfinite induction:
We call elements of V ⊥ names; the rank of a name g is inf{ν : g ∈ V ν ⊥ }. Membership and equality at ⊥ are just given by ∈ and =: As usual, an embedding· of V into V ⊥ can be defined inductively, a = ({b : b ∈ a}, a, f (a)).
We first verify IZF. Extensionality follows immediately from the definition of =. Pairing, Union, and Powerset are componentwise: where π 1 is the projection onto the first coordinate. The simple definition of membership means that Separation is essentially componentwise; {g ∈ h : ϕ(h)} is given by ({g ∈ h(⊥) : ⊥ ϕ(g)}, {a ∈ h(0) : ϕ(a)}, {a ∈ h(1) : ϕ(a)}).
Infinity is witnessed byω. Suppose that ⊥ forces the antecedent of Collection, ∀s ∈ a ∃t ϕ(s, t). Then for all s ∈ a(⊥) there exists t such that ⊥ ϕ(s, t), so we can apply collection in the meta-theory to construct a set b ⊥ from which the ts can be chosen. For i = 0, 1, let b i ⊇ f ⊥,i "b ⊥ witness this instance of Collection at node i. Then b = (b ⊥ , b 0 , b 1 ) witnesses this instance of Collection at ⊥. For Set Induction, if ⊥ forces ∀x (∀y ∈ x ϕ(y) → ϕ(x)), then ⊥ ∀x ϕ(x) can be proved by induction on the rank of g ∈ V ⊥ .
Since the universes at 0, 1 are both classical, DC can be lifted directly to the meta-level: if ⊥ x 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ X ϕ(x, y), then x 0 ∈ S and ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ S (⊥ ϕ(x, y)) where S = {x : ⊥ x ∈ X}. Applying DC at the meta-level we construct a function that can be used to construct a name witnessing the internal instance of DC.
To see that WKL holds, suppose that g ∈ V ⊥ is forced to be a decidable, infinite binary tree at ⊥. Since g is decidable at ⊥, g(⊥), g(0) and g(1) all have the same standard part. Since V 1 is classical, there exists in V 1 an infinite branch α of g (1) . Let α 0 be that standard part of α. Then ({ň | n ∈ α 0 }, α 0 , α) is an infinite branch of g at ⊥.
WLPO fails in our Kripke model because there are names that look like the zero sequence at ⊥ and 0, but have a one at a nonstandard input at 1. Explicitly, let α be a binary sequence in V 1 with the only nonzero terms at nonstandard places. Then g = ({0 n | n ∈ ω}, 0, α) is a binary sequence at ⊥ such that 0 ∀n g(n) = 0 and 1 ∃n g(n) = 1; hence ⊥ does not force WLPO for g.
We now iterate the previous construction, to get a strong separation. The result looks like the third construction in Theorem 4, or the second construction in Theorem 5.
Proof. Second construction: We want each node of our Kripke model to look like ⊥ from the Kripke model in Figure 3 , so our poset will be the full binary tree 2 <ω . For a node σ containing n occurrences of 1, the base model will be M n , the n th iterated ultrapower of V . The sets at a node are those terms built as in the construction just above, as interpreted in the node's base model. The transition functions work as follows: f 0 (x)(⊥) = x(0) = f 0 (x)(0), f 0 (x)(1) = f (x(0)), and f 1 (x)(⊥) = x(1) = f 1 (x)(0), f 1 (x)(1) = f (x(1)), where as usual f is the elementary embedding from any M n to its ultrapower.
As is standard by now, IZF holds. WKL holds, and WLPO fails, as in the first construction.
Concluding remarks
With one exception, we provided models for all of the separations in Figure 1 . Even when redundant, we thought it of interest to provide models in the style of this paper. The one exception is the non-implication from LLPO to WKL. Is there a model of the kind exposited here providing that separation?
With one exception, in all cases we were able to provide a strong separation satisfying DC. That exception is the last one, separating WLPO from WKL. Is there such a separation satisfying DC?
In the first few models for Theorems 4, 5, 9, and 10, does DC hold?
We mentioned some work of Kohlenbach and collaborators, who achieve results similar to some of ours. They use realizability over higher-type arithmetic HA ω . Can those constructions be adapted to provide independence proofs over IZF?
There are plenty of other foundational principles than those we have been discussing here: BD-N, continuity axioms, Church's Thesis, Kripke's Schema, the Fan Theorem and its weakenings, to name a few. It would be nice to see them included in an expanded version of the scheme we present here, to get an overview of all their interrelationships.
One in particular that we will mention, because it fits squarely into our scheme, is a weakening of WKL: weak weak König's lemma (WWKL) states that if every level of a binary tree has at least half the nodes of the full tree, then it has an infinite path. It is easy to see that WKL implies WWKL and WWKL implies LLPO. We conjecture that neither implication reverses. Of course the Lifschitz realizability of [3] separating WKL and LLPO provides one of these separations, we just do not know which. What has been proved [24] is that WWKL is strictly weaker than WKL over RCA 0 , a weak (classical) subsystem of second order arithmetic. That proof was then adapted to a constructive setting in [12] , but applied to the classical contrapositives of WKL and WWKL, there called D-FAN and W-D-FAN respectively. It is then shown that the Yu-Simpson argument that WWKL does not imply WKL translates to a proof that over IZF W-D-FAN does not imply D-FAN. In fact, it is not hard to see that both WKL and WWKL fail in this model. So apparently the classical proof separating WKL and WWKL does not translate to such a separation constructively. (Admittedly there could be other adaptations of the Yu-Simpson proof, so perhaps we should say does not so translate yet.) If one is looking to classical constructions for inspiration, one might think to look at LLPO. To be sure, LLPO itself is a classical triviality, but still one could imagine variants, such as with computability or uniformity hypotheses. We are however unaware of any classical study of any correlate of LLPO, and so have no guidance there.
